INTRODUCTION
This chapter tries to place the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) back into the context of the period in which it was created, in the immediate aftermath of a major genocide, a genocide which the Western powers, the United Nations (UN) and the international community ignored until it was too late. This allowed the gruesome 'work' of killing to be done, so that most of the Tutsi population -and some of their Hutu and Twa defenders -were eliminated. As Uvin and Mironko put it, creating the ICTR: 'was necessary in the light of the total inaction of [the international] […] community during the genocide, which was widely perceived as shameful'. 4 The need to create the ICTR reflected the absence post-Nuremberg and post-Tokyo of any permanent international court able to hold individuals accountable for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. According to Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR from 2003: 'While Nuremberg Rwanda Tribunal' project was also consulted. 9 A few of these filmed interviews have Kinyarwanda sub-titles, enhancing their accessibility for a Rwandan audience. Administrative and support staff are interviewed as well as legal staff and senior personnel, making this a unique resource for the historical record and for researchers on transitional justice in Rwanda in general.
Drawing in part on such material, this chapter traces the outlines of how the ICTR came to be, and reviews some broad debates around its creation and early significance. Some frequent criticisms of its early operation are identified, including questions of delays, bias, costliness and remoteness from most Rwandans. Although it is also important to:
'consider exactly what type of "synergy" exists between international and national attempts to provide accountability for mass atrocities', this is not the main aim of this chapter. 10 Instead, the origins of the ICTR are examined, along with some key debates that arose with the early elaboration of case law. One of the most significant features of the ICTR is how it established a historical record of the widespread occurrence of genocide in Rwanda between April and July 1994. 11 Indeed, this may have been one of the core aims of establishing the institution, to ensure that genocide would 'Never Again' occur in Rwanda. We start with the ICTR's creation and proceed to consider some teething problems of the Tribunal's early years.
THE FIRST POST-NUREMBERG INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
One innovation of both post-war military tribunals, Nuremberg and Tokyo, was to hold individual, named persons, rather than states, accountable for war crimes. 12 In 1993, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then UN Secretary-General, noted two possible methods under international law for creating a special tribunal for trying crimes against humanity; through treaty and under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Given what was seen as the exceptionally urgent need to secure prosecutions of war criminals and genocide leaders in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, '[…] the SecretaryGeneral advised the Security Council to bypass a more traditional treaty process and instead create [the ICTY and ICTR] […] as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII'. 13 The possibility of creating the ICTR in the first place was greatly assisted by the decision a year or so earlier, to create the first 'Special Tribunal' of the post-war era in this way, under Chapter VII through the Security Council. The ICTY and ICTR would both judge war crimes and crimes against humanity, especially genocide.
The same exceptional quality was seen to characterise both situations, and as one source put it:
The creation of two ad hoc war crimes tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR […] by the UN Security Council, the most credible enforcer of norms directed at sovereigns […] [were] (e)stablished by Council fiat in reaction to two perceived 'exceptional' threats to the international peace […] the two tribunals [are] as international in composition as the organization that created them […] [and] granted the power to enforce international criminal law in the context of two geographically and temporally limited instances [including] those committed within Rwanda during 1994. 14 Of course, had the permanent international criminal tribunal been created after Nuremberg, as explicitly provided for in Article VI of the 1948 Genocide Convention, the story of local, national and international justice, including in Rwanda, would have been quite different.
Is it fair to conclude, as Uvin and Mironko have argued, that the ICTR and the ICTY were both typically Western-inspired justice institutions, in which 'symbolic politics' of guilt and blame played a critical role? 15 Is it perhaps for this reason that the much-anticipated sense of justice being done within Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, did not appear very evident? According to Ntanda Nsereko and Richard Karagyesa, former deputy prosecutor, at the start of its operations the ICTR was a kind of blind experiment, in which legal procedures were literally being cobbled 13 Laura Bingham, 'Strategy or Process -Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ' (2006) 692. together and being (re)invented. 16 ICTR staff were: '[…] as it were, navigating in uncharted waters […] the Nuremberg and Tokyo […] precedents were […] of limited utility', when it came to operationalising special tribunals in the mid-1990s post-cold war context. 17 The first step in the creation of the ICTR thus took place unintentionally, when on 25 May 1993: 'The Security Council had adopted a resolution to establish the ICTY'. 18 In 1994, even before the genocide ended, on 1 July, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 935 establishing a commission of experts to report back whether 'acts of genocide' and other crimes against humanity had taken place in Rwanda. 19 Once '[…] the commission confirmed that genocide and systematic, widespread, and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law had indeed been committed in Rwanda, resulting in massive loss of life', this crystallised the decision to establish the ICTR. 20 The commission identified a 'concerted, planned, systematic and methodical' plan to eliminate the Tutsi population -a genocide plan; it also concluded that although the genocide was against the Tutsi: 'Individuals from both sides to the armed conflict have perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law […] [and] Individuals from both sides to the armed conflict have perpetrated crimes against humanity in Rwanda'. 21 Although other options were considered, in the end the ICTR was 'tied' to the ICTY. 22 31 Those who are hostile to the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda, especially those in the diaspora and critical scholars, view the ICTR as biased in favour of the Rwandan government. They insist RPF war crimes should be tried, as well as crimes of genocide, and cite the now-infamous Gersony Report. 32 Peter Erlinder, often seen as a genocide denier and defence lawyer at the ICTR of senior members of the genocidal former government, suggests the ICTR was a plaything of the regime in Kigali from 1994 onwards. 33 Studies starting from this perspective tend to focus on episodes of conflict and mismatched expectations between ICTR prosecutors, the UN Security Council and successive governments in Kigali. 34 For some more critical legal scholars, the Western countries that fund the ICTR are the main problem. For them, the ICTR is simply part of a much wider trend of dismantling locally-grounded solutions and replacing them with 'donor-driven' justice and 'tribunalization' of post-conflict upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault' would be prosecuted. 40 During the Akayesu case, rape started to be defined as a crime of genocide, and was broadened to include various forms of sexual violence besides sexual penetration. 41 International relations experts are divided. Some see the ICTR's creation as mainly being to assuage Western guilt at having failed to act to prevent genocide in time, thus playing into the hands of the side that gained power. 42 For some, the ICTR like other international tribunals can even be seen as a manifestation of the 'internationalization of [a state of] exception', through 'tribunalization'. 43 Others view the ICTR more optimistically as an integral part of a global transitional arrangement, a 'cascade of justice' sweeping the globe. 44 However politically sensitive the relationship between the ICTR and the government in Rwanda, from a legal point of view, the legacy of the ICTR is widely agreed to be ground-breaking, and for many: 'The influence of the tribunals on the development of international criminal law cannot […] be [over]-estimated'. 45 International criminal lawyers and human rights organisations acknowledge that the ICTR and ICTY have 'created a jurisprudence that has both transformed international law and directly affected State behaviour'. 46 Some legal scholars view the ICTR and ICTY as evidence of the victory of 'legalists' over realists concerning international criminal accountability. 47 What is perhaps less clear is whether the ICTR has contributed to the originally stated aims of the UN Security Council Resolution 955, adopted on 8 November 1994, one aim of which was to ' […] contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace'. Another general principle was: 'to strengthen the courts and judicial system of Rwanda '. 48 This begs the whole question of how one assesses something as complex as a reconciliation process, or the impact on Rwandans of the ICTR. One scholar of transitional justice refers to:
[…] a huge gap in our empirical knowledge with respect to what transitional justice may or may not do for reconciliation […] [moreover] there is still much debate about the meaning of the term [i.e. reconciliation], and little empirical evidence of how different transitional justice mechanisms may affect achievement of this desired outcome. 49 Whether the ICTR has contributed to national reconciliation and to strengthening Rwanda's own legal institutions is open to dispute. As was mentioned earlier, the Rwanda's transitional government soon opposed the ICTR, despite having called for its creation. Inside Rwanda, the main goal was to end impunity and reassure victims and survivors alike that justice was being done. Yet a realistic view would be that for mutual understanding and reconciling victims with perpetrators, a lot more is needed than to prosecute individual cases, however senior those individuals may have been. In many ways, it seems that gacaca (the neo-traditional hearings that took place in 11,000 Rwandan communities between 2002 and 2012) was viewed as more relevant to local justice concerns inside Rwanda, a relevance the ICTR failed to achieve. 50
INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNINGS
Though not explicitly stated in the provisions that created it, it does appear that one main purpose of the ICTR was to make it impossible for future generations to imagine there was no genocide in Rwanda. Paul Kagame has stated that the ICTR was created 'to try genocide perpetrators'. 51 The Tribunal's scope was originally to try: 'persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994' (italics added). In the case of the ICTR, the court records not only served to find those indicted guilty or not guilty; they also provided undeniable evidence for the historical record of specific sets of atrocities committed during the genocide. This was also true during the Nuremberg trials, when one of the prosecutors, William Zeck, explained that, whilst he did not join the Nuremberg trials with the aim of creating an historical record, even so: 'we established a history and all the skinheads that can be collected […] anywhere and all the naysayers have to face the history, the transcripts of the Nuremberg trials'. 52 53 Perhaps this can be seen as the main legacy of the ICTR for ordinary Rwandans, rather than reconciliation or reparative justice; the main achievement may be simple recognition.
Thus key events that took place in Rwanda between 6 April and mid-July 1994 are preserved in the legal records of the ICTR, including victims' testimony and expert witnesses' statements. Magnarella comments in the Kambanda case that: 'Kambanda's extensive confession concerning his government's intentional policy of genocide constitutes the foundation upon which later ICTR prosecutions have rested. Kambanda's confession also destroys the credibility, if it ever existed, of revisionist historians, who claim a genocide never took place' at all. 54 However, the ICTR is not a truth commission, but a criminal tribunal which has as its main task to investigate crimes that took place during a 57 According to Adama Dieng, had it been located inside Rwanda, this would have complicated the rendering of justice 'in serenity'. 58 Locating the ICTR in Arusha meant some schisms and biases were avoided, but the Tribunal's location in Tanzania also weakened any sense of national ownership among Rwandans and their leaders, over the Tribunal and its proceedings and case law.
From as early as late April 1994, as Kaufman shows, the US government was one of those who expressed their desire to see prosecutions for war crimes committed in Rwanda, and was considering various options from domestic prosecutions to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and mentioning the possibility of a special tribunal. 59 Despite donors' commitment to creating a 'linked' special tribunal, the ICTR was a relatively neglected institution when it first began to operate. Located many thousands of miles away, outside the ambit of mainstream media attention and removed from the ICTY in The Hague, the ICTR when it started its operations had just one 'small courtroom and two trial chambers to address possible crimes involving the murder of hundreds of thousands'. It was reported that 'the first hearing of the Tribunal, presided over by Senegalese Judge Laïty Kama, took place in a small room with a leaky ceiling', with very little in the way of furniture, interpreting staff, security or even stationery. 60 trial judges and five appeal judges. 61 Despite this situation, the ICTR started concluding cases more rapidly than the better funded ICTY. This may in part reflect additional moral pressure on the Tribunal to show it was serious, and so convince the Rwandan government to support its work.
The final obstacle to the ICTR's creation had been removed when the UN Security Council members agreed that genocide had taken place in Rwanda. 62 By this time, however, it was too late to step in to limit killings, and: 'the United States looked like the dullest and most callous kid in the class'. 63 Moral pressure from experts like Alison des Forges heightened Western feelings of guilt and played a significant part in adding pressure to create the ICTR rapidly. 64 And once it was created, the fear of being accused of racism and double standards meant the ICTR was soon almost as well-funded and staffed as the ICTY already in place. As des Forges and Longman observe:
Even during the genocide, international actors began to talk of the need for justice, an idea that was fed by their sense of guilt […] since the crimes in Rwanda were so much more blatant and grievous and large in scale than those committed in the former Yugoslavia, failure to create a mechanism comparable to the ICTY would almost certainly have led to accusations of racism. 65 As the report of a national conference on 'Genocide, Impunity and Accountability: Dialogue for a National and International Response', held in Kigali in December 1995, stated: 'The Conference notes that the international community's abandonment of Rwanda before and during the genocide […] damaged the credibility and reputation of the international community'. 66 The desire to restore some credibility to their own image, may have led decision-makers in several Western 'democratic' The judgement and sentence document for this case alone, run to almost 600 pages. Marie-Lucienne Lambert, associate legal officer, assisting Chamber 1 judges on the Military 1 case, explains that she spent almost two years working on the judgement for this case. 73 The post-ICTR website created to facilitate public access to case documents provides access to all original indictment documents, judgements and sentences, and appeal documents, on a case-by-case basis. 74 Despite all these achievements, from the start there was a great deal of criticism of the ICTR from all sides of the political spectrum. Barbara Oomen sums up the main criticisms that the ICTR was too: '[…] slow, too bureaucratic, corrupt at times, too detached from Rwandan reality and above all too costly'. 75 Some of these criticisms are considered in later chapters of this book.
There were also periods of open confrontation between the Tribunal prosecutor and the Rwandan government. In 2002, for example: 'the Rwandan government imposed new travel restrictions on Rwandans, making it impossible for some witnesses to leave Rwanda in order to travel to Arusha to testify in court. As a result, the ICTR had to suspend three trials in June 2002 for lack of witnesses'. 76 To confirm Oomen's main points, almost from the start, the main complaints about the ICTR inside Rwanda and internationally were: (1) that the Tribunal was too slow; (2) that it was too far removed from Rwandan realities; (3) that it was too expensive; and (4) that it was 'soft' on leading genocide suspects. By the same token, ICTR was claimed not to be victim-centred enough when it came to providing reparations or taking survivors' -especially women survivors -needs into account. Referring mainly to the early years, this chapter will now briefly review some of these criticisms.
ASSESSING THE EARLY RECORD OF THE ICTR
During the early years 1995-2002, only eight cases were concluded at the ICTR. Moreover, some senior genocide organisers had to be released on procedural grounds, due to legal errors, including avoidable delays. 80 On occasion suspects facing trial were kept in prison for too long. In extraordinarily complex and multiple cases like the Military I and Media cases, hundreds of crimes of genocide by several individuals were being judged. The Military I trial judgement was among the longest in the history of the ICTR. 81 The question, however, is what the problem was and whether it resulted from inefficiency on the part of Tribunal staff, or their extraordinarily complex case load.
Initially delays were worsened by distrust between the ICTR and the Rwandan government. In September 1994 the UN representative for Rwanda in the Security Council cast the only no vote when Resolution 955 was passed, despite the Rwandan government having requested the creation of the ICTR a few months earlier. 82 After the ICTR was established in Arusha, in early 1995 Prosecutor Richard Goldstone had to wait till December that year for his first visit to Kigali to discuss cooperation with the Rwandan authorities. 83 This slow start was aggravated by tensions within Rwanda and distrust between the transitional government in Kigali and ICTR staff, a situation which reinforced a preference not to hire Rwandans for ICTR prosecution and investigation teams. Richard Karagyesa, who The Rwandan government objected to the ICTR being located outside Rwanda, and wanted a much more direct role in the prosecution process. The Rwandan government's Office of the Prosecutor expressed dismay that donors were happy to fund ICTR and yet were hardly assisting with the massive task of reconstructing the judicial infrastructure within Rwanda. 85 There was more and more media attention being paid to the rising number of genocide suspects held in Rwanda's grossly overcrowded prisons, whilst in its early years most of the media attention directed at the ICTR was broadly positive and hopeful. 86 One reason ICTR staff soon came under considerable pressure to provide 'value for money', was that very early on, in 1996-97, 'gross mismanagement in almost all areas of the Tribunal' and 'numerous operational deficiencies of a substantial nature' were uncovered by auditors of the UN Office of Internal Oversight Investigation. 87 Shortly afterwards, more qualified and committed staff were recruited. Even so, even after a generation of new appointments, some believed that nepotism remained rife at the Tribunal. Inside Rwanda, it was suggested in 1995 that legal procedures should be adapted to the post-genocide context, so that 'special' rules of evidence would operate. It was suggested, for example, that: '[…] an Interahamwe [sic] […] be considered guilty of genocide and the onus be on each individual Interahamwe to prove the contrary', which clearly was unacceptable as a guiding 84 Karagyesa explains that the Rwandan case later converged with the Sierra Leone case, which had both national and international judges. Richard In the Military I case, the defence counsel argued that there had been unreasonable delays in the cases coming to justice. In the case of Colonel Bagosora, part of the Military I case, it was claimed there had been delays of several years. Paragraph 73 of the judgement and sentence, which eventually emerged in December 2008, states that:
The Defence teams claim that the right to trial without undue delay was violated … In particular, seven months elapsed from [when] the Tribunal in August 1996 confirmed his Indictment and ordered his continued detention in Cameroon until he pleaded guilty before the Tribunal in March 1997 … his trial was initially scheduled to start in March 1998, but postponed because the Prosecution initially requested the joinder of his case with 28 others, which failed, and then ultimately with Kabiligi, Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva, which succeeded. These efforts at joinder delayed the commencement of his trial for four years (own emphasis). This attempt to try 29 people was the so-called Global indictment that had been over-ruled, attempted in the first few years of the ICTR's operation, and 'meant to create a mega trial that would tackle the pyramidal structure of political authority during the genocide', see Don Webster 'The Uneasy Relationship between the ICTR and Gacaca' in Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf (eds)
Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence
To tackle such endemic delays, in 2003 the number of ad litem judges allowed to sit on specific ICTR cases was increased from four to nine. This may have been one way of acknowledging that the sheer pressure of work was proving overwhelming for existing staff of the ICTR, among them the judges. 92 Evidence suggests the failure of ICTR to contribute positively to reconciliation inside Rwanda as well. 93 As Innocent Kamanzi suggests, in future international criminal courts like the ICC would be strengthened by 'much more involvement directly in the country where the people have suffered'. 94 According to Koosed, there was little attention to rehabilitation programs in the work of the ICTR at the start; legal processes were not adapted to the realities of the situation inside Rwanda, and this meant a great deal of ad hoc decision-making. Yet it needs to be acknowledged that:
[…] the ICTR's efforts to transform Rwandan cultural understandings into standards of legal proof represent a unique use of jurisprudence itself to bridge the gap of geographic, cultural and legal distance between the ICTR judges and Rwandans themselves. 95 Claiming that donors control the ICTR's agenda has been a recurring theme in Rwandan government's criticism of the institution, from the start. This case has been argued in detail by several scholars. 96 As Paul Kagame has written: 'The ICTR has spent more than $1bn [billion] on the prosecution of only a handful of cases. Its physical detachment from Rwanda has prevented it from meaningfully engaging with the Rwandan people'. 97 Yet, following what appeared to be the undue influence of the Rwandan government over ICTR procedures and staffing decisions in 2003, a number of NGOs issued a joint statement, warning that 'in attempting to improve the efficiency of the prosecutor's office, the Security Council must ensure that changes do not undermine the independence and impartiality of the ICTR, including in prosecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity by members of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)'. 98 At the start, the ICTR was not properly supported professionally or financially, and the result was that: 'Posts often took more than a year to fill, and many candidates were hired, even for posts of great responsibility, without ever being interviewed. Many prosecutors came from academia or human rights organizations with little or no experience with criminal prosecutions'. 99 Some new appointments were inspired by the process of justice that they witnessed. Thus, observing the case of Georges Rutaganda, former head of the Interahamwe militia, Karagyesa, later acting chief of prosecutions, remembered: 'I sat in the public gallery and watched, and my prosecutorial instincts came back, this is what I want to do.' 100 Right after the genocide the transitional government in Kigali had some legitimate concerns with securing overall control and political stability inside the national territory of Rwanda. The Rwandan government at times prevented witnesses from travelling to give evidence at the ICTR, and once even stopped the prosecutor from entering Rwanda, despite the Office of the Prosecutor being based in Kigali at that time. 101 Such pressure from the Rwandan government was acknowledged by Louise Arbour, former chief prosecutor, who stated: 'Whether we want it or not, we must come to terms with the fact that our ability to continue with our prosecution and investigations depend on the government of Rwanda. That is the reality that we face'. 102 Until at least 2000 or so, the Kigali government's overall attitude could be described as: '[…] at best neutral or indifferent, and at worst hostile to the ICTR […]', and through a series of rear-guard actions, at one point there arose, 'a total cut-off of relations', which in turn delayed the Tribunal, by making it almost impossible for witnesses and investigators to travel back and forth. 103 Such tensions were inherent in the ICTR's mandate and in how it had to construct case evidence through the prism of Rwandan history and the central crime of genocide. As Koosed notes:
[…] these limitations and the imperative of institutional impartiality […] make it structurally impossible for the ICTR to fulfil its legal mandate of prosecuting those most responsible for the Rwandan genocide without making significant political concessions to the governments of UN member states, most importantly Rwanda itself. 104 Even so, the efforts of the ICTR to bring senior officials of the genocide regime to justice may be better appreciated by ordinary Rwandans than is generally thought. Innocent Kamanzi, a Rwandan who worked as ICTR information officer, interviewed in 2008, explained:
When we project [films to ordinary Rwandans] in Kinyarwanda, which show how those former leaders go into the court in handcuffs and are facing justice, they find it hard to believe […] it shifts something in their minds […] and they know that nobody can come again and order them to kill others. 105 According to this relatively optimistic view, even if most ordinary Rwandans were not easily persuaded that the ICTR was working on their behalf during the early years, outreach work by Rwandans was now starting to persuade them that the Tribunal was there for them. As Kamanzi further explains:
In 1997-98 I was the first Rwandan journalist to be based in the ICTR to report on proceedings there […] justice sector officials inside Rwanda, and by being in constant touch with government, the ICTR does seem to have fulfilled one of its original aims, namely to strengthen the justice system inside Rwanda. In some ways, the controversy raging for several years about where and how ICTR proceedings should be archived (they are most likely to remain in The Hague, with digital copies of selected documents in Kigali) highlights the significance of the Tribunal as a historical record-forming institution. The lasting significance of the ICTR as a record of historical memory is not something necessarily made explicit by those who supported its creation in the first place. 107 Yet it is ironic that as: '[…] leaders preached a firm commitment to the fight against impunity', of leading genocide suspects, the same leaders resisted: '[…] any probe into their own criminal responsibility at the [ICTR]'. 108 Such impunity has tended to counter the encouraging example for ordinary Rwandans of senior figures being prosecuted for their crimes. ICTR outreach activities have also tried to convince Rwandans that leaders who commit crimes will be held accountable, and that they will not 'get away with it'. The outcome can be that whilst justice is viewed as partial in the short-term, in the longer term, efforts to end impunity are likely to continue to focus on those not yet indicted. Restorative justice has become the new yardstick by which the ICTR, national courts and neo-traditional gacaca 'hearings on the grass' are judged in terms of political and legal legitimacy. 109 The ICTR can be seen as a pioneering effort to incorporate victims' frames of reference into international law-making. Those who gave evidence in Arusha conveyed their own narrative and understanding of the genocide, helping to construct the combined narrative of genocide that has come to form a basis for assessing the guilt or innocence of the accused. For all its later weight and significance, as Richard Karagyesa explains: 'We basically started from scratch […] investigators did not know the elements of the crimes they were investigating […] we had to operate through interpreters with no system of quality assurance […] There were very many difficulties involved in investigating and putting a case together'. 110 One staff member interviewed in 2008 also notes the emotional exhaustion of the work: 'Nothing prepares you for the work here, the sheer scale of the atrocities, their gruesome nature. Never in a lifetime would you normally experience this. It takes its toll emotionally'. 111 Sacrifices made by judges and other staff involve: 'prolonged separation from family; disruption of domestic professional life and career opportunities; and the significant burden of adjudicating atrocities on the scale of genocide'. 112 Koosed -who interned and like Eltringham conducted extensive interviews with ICTR staff -has suggested that accusations of partiality are part and parcel of the 'paradox of impartiality'. In his view, it was: '[…] structurally impossible for the ICTR to fulfil its legal mandate of prosecuting those most responsible for the Rwandan genocide without making significant political concessions to the governments of UN member states, most importantly Rwanda itself'. 113 Stringent requirements of judges' impartiality was one way the ICTR tried to avoid accusations of bias, accusations which may have arisen from wildly unrealistic expectations of what it could achieve on what was prosecution. 120 In terms of bias, the sheer pressure of work may have been a factor, as most senior staff had 'hardly any time to reflect […]', and were kept extremely busy in meeting deadlines in the work of completing trials and ending the work of the ICTR. 121 Concluding their review of the ICTR, national courts and gacaca, Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko conclude that the ICTR, like the ICTY has been a massive international experiment with justice, adding 'One can only hope the experiment will work -foremost for Rwandans, who so desperately need to return to normalcy and community, but also for donors, who will be sorely tempted to choose a safer path if this effort were to fail'. 122 A less sanguine view is that: 'Rwandan participation in ICTR proceedings has essentially been limited to serving as witnesses and defendants, rendering the vast majority of victims completely uninvolved in the ICTR's work; a small number of Rwandans are given the opportunity to watch, and an even smaller number the opportunity to participate'. 123
ICTR AND LEGAL INNOVATION
In many ways, the first Chief Prosecutor Goldstone set the agenda when he suggested from the start that: 'insufficient attention had been paid over the years […] to gender-related crime'. 124 As he stressed, whatever the time taken, the ICTY and ICTR were to make historic strides in this respect, by bringing sexual violence and gender violence to the forefront of international humanitarian law (the law of war). This set 'an important precedent in respect to gender-related crimes because it is the first time that systematic mass rape is ever being charged and prosecuted as a war crime'. 125 Explaining the relatively few prosecutions after Akayesu for rape as a crime of genocide, Richard Karagyesa points to the silence around a culturally taboo issue. 126 Sadat suggests that the ICTR has been an excellent training ground for a whole generation of international 120 Ibid, para. 126. 121 criminal lawyers and judges, now also far more familiar with the Rwandan context than they once had been. 127 the function of gacaca, which as was suggested earlier, has at least exposed the evidence of crimes of genocide at local level, even if it has not always resulted in reconciliation among Rwandans on the hills. 139 As feminist scholars of transitional justice also remind us, the problem of law not matching with the daily realities of those on the ground has generated: '[…] growing feminist unease about the gap between ostensible feminist gains in international law and the actual impact of international law on women's daily lives'. 140 More widely, the same gap between legal evaluations of the ICTR and its evaluation on the ground, applies to most Rwandans.
For Rwandans, the purpose of the ICTR may not be that obvious. However, by trying senior ranking individuals, the Tribunal has managed to avoid what Richard Goldstone called: '[…] a collective guilt syndrome […] laying guilt upon a whole people, ethnic group or nation because of the misdeeds and manipulation of perpetrators […]' 141 Individual accountability has been a significant mark of ending impunity, ensuring that ICTR staff contribute to doing justice in practice, as well as in the law.
In conclusion, it does seem that the original goals of the ICTR, and especially holding key figures responsible for the genocide accountable, have been largely -though not entirely -achieved. Although some key figures remain at large, ultimately, '[…] the best defence of the ICTR's work lies in the fact that almost the entire interim government of the Rwandan genocide era has been placed on trial', and most are serving prison sentences. 142 This sense of relief is echoed by Roland Amoussouga, spokesman for the court, who suggests: 'Thanks to the work of this Tribunal we have taken out of the main traffic, obstacles to peace and reconciliation, through the people who were the main target of the Prosecutor. When they were still [out there] Rwandans were not sleeping '. 143 139
